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Abstract This chapter in the book on transnational inquiries and the protection of
fundamental rights in criminal proceedings takes into account the particular, and
perhaps unique situation in the United States (US) following the terrorist attacks
on 11 September 2001. It explores the laws regulating inquiries by foreign
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governments who seek evidence in the US to use in criminal proceedings overseas,
but primarily the protections recognized by US statutes and jurisprudence when US
officials gather evidence abroad. In this respect, the chapter focuses on protections
during interrogations, searches, interceptions of confidential communications, and
examinations of witnesses and explores when the protection differs, depending on
whether the target of the investigative measure is a US-, or non US-citizen, or
whether the investigating officials are part of the criminal justice apparatus or
belong to the military or the intelligence community. Finally, the chapter explores
the admissibility of evidence gathered in the same areas, depending on whether it is
used in the normal civilian criminal courts, or in the newly constituted military
commissions instituted for trial of foreigners accused of international terrorism.

Abbreviations
AG
ASPA
CAT
CIA
CJPA
Con st.
CSRT
DOD
DOJ
DTA
FBI
FISA
FRCrimP
ICC
ICTR
ICTY
KSM
MLAT
NATO

usc
ussc
1

Attorney General
American Service-Members' Protection Act
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Central Intelligence Agency
Classified Information Protection Act
Constitution
Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Department of Defense
Department of Justice
Detention Treatment Act 2005
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
International Criminal Court
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
United States Code
United States Supreme Court

Introduction

Since the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9-11) there have been
radical changes in the way evidence is gathered by US officials overseas. During the
administration of George W. Bush, government officials sought to justify brutal and
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illegal methods, such as kidnapping or "extraordinary rendition," indefinite incommunicado detention and the use of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, which would otherwise be impermissible in a normal criminal prosecution. Because evidence derived from such practices would not be admissible in a
normal trial, the US set up a parallel system of military commissions to deal with
those detained in the "war on terror" in which evidence tainted by illegal practices
would have a better chance not only of being admitted, but also of being accepted
by the triers of fact, who would be military officers in lieu of citizen jurors, and
would decide by majority vote, rather than unanimous verdict. At risk are the very
foundations of the American notions of due process in both the pre-trial treatment
of criminal suspects and in the process of ascertaining guilt and imposing
punishment.
Today, we find two sets of rules, two types of courts, and two types of accuseds:
one for the normal criminal defendant and the other for the "enemy combatant." In
the US, criminal defendants enjoy a presumption of release pending trial. 1 The
Sixth Amendment to the US Const. guarantees them the right to a speedy, public
trial by jury and the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them.
The Fifth Amendment to the constitution and due process prevent the use of
confessions which were given involuntarily, or without knowledge of the privilege
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. "Enemy combatants," on the
other hand, as will be seen below, are deprived of many of these rights.
In this country report, I will discuss the differing rules that apply for overseas
investigations, depending on whether the investigation is conducted by federal law
enforcement officials, or army or CIA officials, and I will discuss the admissibility
of evidence gathered, both in the context of a normal criminal trial in the federal
courts, and before a military commission.

2

Cross-Border Investigations and Human Rights

2.1
2.1.1

Investigations of Foreign Governments in the US
Letters Rogatory and Their Enforcement

Federal courts have the inherent power to issue letters rogatory. The relevant statute
is 28 USC § 1782, which provides, in pertinent part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before
formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request

1

18 USC §3142(b), provides that a judicial officer "shall" release a person before trial, unless
certain factors require coercive measures.
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made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person
and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be
produced, before a person appointed by the court( ... ) The order may prescribe the practice
and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign
country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the
document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the
testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A person may not be compelled to
give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any
legally applicable privilege.

Letters rogatory may be issued in situations where ordinary means of discovery
under Rule 15 FRCrimP fail? According to the USSC, an "interested person,"
could refer not only to "litigants before foreign or international tribunals, but also
foreign and international officials as well as any other person whether he be
designated by foreign law or international convention or merely possess a reasonable interest in obtaining the assistance." 3 The term "tribunal" in the statute does
not include private arbitrations, 4 but otherwise includes "investigating magistrates,
administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts."5 Letters rogatory
may be issued even if a criminal case has not yet been charged, as long as the
initiation of criminal proceedings "be within reasonable contemplation."6
Furthermore, a court may issue a letter rogatory related to a proceeding in a
foreign court even when the information sought would not be discoverable under
the same circumstances in a US domestic criminal proceeding and even when the
country requesting the letter rogatory would not allow discovery under the same
circumstances in its own courts. 7 This approach is in line with the policy reasons
behind letters rogatory of assisting foreign litigation in order to encourage reciprocal behavior on the part of foreign courts and of promoting judicial economy in
internationallitigation. 8
In exercising their discretion on whether to issue a letter rogatory, courts must
take a number of factors into consideration: (1) Is the person from whom discovery
is sought a participant in the foreign proceeding? (2) What is the nature of the
foreign tribunal? (3) What is the character of the proceedings underway? (4) What
is the receptivity of the foreign tribunal to US federal court assistance? (5) Does the
discovery request seek to circumvent restrictions or policies of the foreign government or the US? (6) Is the discovery request unduly burdensome or intrusive?9

2

United States v. Jefferson, 594 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2009).
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 257 (2004).
4
Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880,883 (5th Cir. 1999).
5
USSC, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices (footnote 3), 258
6
/bid., 259.
1
/bid., 262.
8
Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1102 (2nd Cir. 1995).
9
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices (footnote 3), 264, 265.
3
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Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties

MLATs provide an alternative framework for judicial assistance than that
established by 28 USC§ 1782 and subsequent case law. The US is party to dozens
of MLATs, most of these being bilateral treaties. Several MLATs govern judicial
assistance with supranational organizations. Such supranational organizations
include the European Union, Europol and Eurojust. 10 MLATs provide a broad
range of cooperation measures between the US and foreign countries in criminal
matters, including the taking of testimony or statements from witnesses, obtaining
documents, records, and evidence, serving legal documents, locating or identifying
persons, executing requests for searches and seizures, and providing assistance
related to the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime and collecting fines imposed as a
sentence in a criminal prosecution. 11

3 Investigations Conducted by US Officials Abroad

3.1
3.1.1

Detention of Suspects Abroad
Arrest and Pre-trial Detention of Suspected Criminals

The Fourth Amendment of the US Const. 12 requires probable cause that a person
has committed a crime, before any arrest is possible. An arrested person must be
brought before a judge as soon as is practicable, but in no case later than 48 hours
from the time of arrest. 13 The prosecutor may request that a person charged with
certain serious felonies be detained pretrial, 14 or a person may be detained due to an
inability to post bail. However, the length of detention is strictly limited by the right
to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and by the federal speedy trial
statute, which requires that trial start no later than 100 to 130 days after arrest unless
a judge makes a reasoned decision to grant an extension based in the interests of
justice. 15

10
See U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force 86, 87, 88 (2010), http:f/www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/
index.htm.
11
United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 363 (3rd Cir. 2005).
12
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
13
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).
14
18 usc§ 3142(f)(l).
15
18 USC§§ 3161(b,c); 3161(h)(8)(A) .
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The Detention of "Enemy Combatants"
On 18 September 2001, Congress gave the President the authority to "utilize all
necessary and adequate force against the nations, organizations or persons who, in
his opinion, planned, committed or aided the terrorist attacks which took place on
September ll 1h, or against those who gave them refuge to prevent future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by these nations, organizations and
persons." 16
On 13 November 2001, President Bush issued a decree authorizing the detention
of persons whom the president identified as "enemy combatants" and their prosecution by military commissions. 17 After the invasion of Afghanistan large numbers
of prisoners were transported to the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba,
which began to function as an internment camp. Other more high-level prisoners,
such as the alleged mastermind of the 9-11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
(hereafter KSM) were kept in secret "black sites" in the Middle East and elsewhere.
The Bush Administration denied the internees prisoner of war status under the
Geneva Conventions 18 and used this as pretext to subject them to severe methods of
interrogation. The government also maintained, given that Guantanamo was not
located on US territory, that the prisoners were not entitled to the benefits of the writ
of habeas cmpus to question the legality of their detention. 19
The strategy of the Bush administration to find a detention center where neither
international nor American law would apply, was rebuffed by the USSC. In Rasul v.
Bush, the USSC rejected the argument, that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over foreigners held at Guantanamo and interpreted the habeas cmpus statute
to bestow upon them the right to seek review of their detention status in the federal
courts. 20 Immediately following this decision, the DOD established two types of
courts to decide the legality of the Guantanamo detentions: (I) "combatant status
review tribunals" (CSRT) would decide if the detainees are, in fact, enemy
combatants and (2) military commissions would judge those accused of terrorist
crimes, such as aiding AI Qaeda.
The USSC found, however, that the procedures before the CSRT violated the
prisoners' rights to confront the charges, inasmuch as there was no right to counsel
and there were no limits on the admission of hearsay testimony and the opportunity
to question witnesses was "more theoretical than real." It also held that the appeal
provisions again violated the right to petition in habeas cmpus before the federal
district courts. 21

16

§ 2, Pub. Law 107-140, 115 Stat. 224 (18 September 2001).
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (13
November 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 57833.
18
Abrams (2008), 630.
19
Art. I, § 9 US Canst. provides that: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it,"
20
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,483-484 (2004).
21
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771, 789-792 (2008).
17
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The USSC also held that the Military Commissions Act of 2006, regulating trial
before the new courts, violated the Geneva Conventions and due process, because it
did not provide a defendant the safeguards one has before a normal military court
martial in the US. 22 Immediately after being elected, President Obama announced
that he would close the detention center at Guantanamo, but he also declared that he
had the power to detain alleged terrorists indefinitely in other countries and that he
would maintain prisons in Afghanistan to use for this purpose?3 Since then, however,
Congress has stifled this attempt by passing legislation preventing the transfer of any
of the Guantanamo detainees to prisons on US soil except to stand trial. 24

Kidnapping and Extraordinary Rendition
In order to avoid the restrictions on torture by US officials, the CIA has, since 1996,
engaged in the practice of "extraordinary rendition," that is, transporting prisoners
captured overseas to "black sites" in the Middle East and elsewhere, so they could
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment while interrogated
by foreign officials. 25
Already in 1886, the USSC held that the fact that a US citizen is kidnapped
overseas in order to be brought to trial in the US does not violate due process or
prevent a trial from going forward? 6 More recently, the USSC held that the
kidnapping of a Mexican citizen in Mexico, and his forced transport to the US,
did not prevent his standing trial for murder of a US drug enforcement officer even
if the abduction violated the US-Mexico extradition treaty?7
Although Art. VI, US Const., expressly gives treaties status as the "law of the
land," the US courts have authorized Congress to, if necessary, enact laws which
contravene customary international law?8 As early as 1989, the Office of Legal
Counsel of the US DOJ, issued an opinion, claiming it does not violate the Fourth
Amendment for the US FBI to investigate and arrest criminal suspects overseas
even if it violates customary internationallaw?9
In the few cases of "extraordinary rendition" that have made it to the US courts,
it has been difficult for the victims to prevail in their suits against the government
due to the doctrine of "official secrets." Thus, a civil suit by Khalid el-Masri,
22

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 615--624 (2006).
Savage (2009), A20.
24
Mayer (2010), 60.
25
Since 9-11, the C.I.A. has transported from 100 to 150 alleged terrorists between countries,
especially in the Middle East. See Jehl and Johnston (2005).
26
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1886).
27
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669--670 (1992).
28
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2nd Cir. 2003).
29
O.L.C, D.O.J. Authority of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation to Override International Law in
Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities (21 June 1989).
23
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a German citizen of Lebanese descent who was detained in Macedonia, turned over
to the CIA, and then sent to a "black site" in Afghanistan, where he alleged he was
tortured, was prevented from suing the CIA and private companies because the
government claimed it would have to reveal classified information relating to the
program of rendition which would compromise national security. 30

3.2
3.2.1

Interrogations
Rules If Conducted by US Law Enforcement Officials
(or with their Cooperation)

In normal criminal investigations, American courts use two tests to ascertain the
constitutionality of a police interrogation: the test developed in the landmark
decision of Miranda v. Arizona, which applies only to suspects who are in police
custody and requires police, before interrogating, to advise the suspect of the right
to silence, the right to counsel, and the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent,31 and the "voluntariness" test, which applies to all interrogations, even those
which are conducted after a suspect is properly advised of his rights under the
Miranda decision.
An important exception to the rules articulated in the Miranda case was carved
out when the USSC allowed interrogators to withhold giving the warnings if there
were an issue of public safety, such as finding a dangerous weapon. 32 On 21
October 2010, the FBI issued a memorandum, advising its officers to intensively
interrogate terrorism suspects under the "public safety" exception, about any
possible plots or dangers before advising them of their rights under Miranda? 3
Confessions obtained by torture and other methods designed to undermine the
free will of the suspect have always been prohibited in the US under the "voluntariness" test. 34 The US ratified the CAT in November of 1994.
If an interrogation is conducted abroad by US officials, or by foreign officials in
a "joint venture," in which US officials play a substantial role, then US rules apply
to the extent practicable. Courts have, however, said that the Miranda warnings
may be modified due to the possibility that the government will have difficulty
overseas in obtaining counsel for prisoners. 35

30

EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-468 (1966).
32
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-656 (1984).
33
Savage (2011), A14.
34
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-287 (1936).
35
In re Terrorist bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 198-199
(2d Cir. 2008).
31
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Finally, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not prevent
US officials from compelling a citizen under oath in an extradition proceeding to
make statements that might open him up to criminal liability in the country seeking
his extradition? 6

3.2.2

Rules If Conducted by Military Officials or the CIA

Before 9-11, the US military used deception, tricks, and certain types of threats
during interrogation of prisoners, which might have violated the due process test of
"voluntariness" and the fruits of which would not have been admissible in a normal
criminal trial. But the U.S. military has never officially allowed techniques that
would violate the CAT.
But after 9-11, the official attitude changed. After the publication of photographs
of the sadistic acts of torture and humiliation performed by US soldiers in the Iraqi
prison of Abu Ghraib, it was revealed that lawyers in the White House and DOJ had
written memoranda, maintaining that the President has the right to use "enhanced
interrogation methods" in the exercise of his emergency powers during wartime.
They maintained that, for a technique to amount to "torture," it would have to inflict
physical pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death." For
purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture, it would have to "last for months
or even years.'' 37
The DOD permitted so-called "Category II" techniques, which included the use
of stress positions, false information and documents, isolation of up to 30 days,
interrogations which lasted up to 20 hours, stimulus deprivation, the use of hooding,
forced nudity, cutting the hair and beards of Muslim detainees, the exploitation of
phobias and scaring the prisoners with dogs. However, only with the permission of
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, could the interrogators resort to more
intensive "Category III'' techniques, such as exposure to cold and water, the use
of a wet towel to provoke a false perception of asphyxiation ("waterboarding") 38
and the use of physical contact which did not cause injuries. 39
Congress finally responded to the outrage caused by the torture memos and
specifically prohibited the use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading methods
in the 2005 DTA. 40 Upon taking office, President Barack Obama decreed that all
36

United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666,673 (1998).
Bybee memorandum, I August 2002 (main author, John Yoo). In: Abrams (2008), 460.
38
Water boarding was used more than 183 times against KSM. Mayer (2010), 58.
39
US DOD, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. II, 2002). Abrams
(2008), 461.
40
42 USC § 2000dd. The DTA defines "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" as that prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, thus referring back to the "involuntariness" test
discussed above.
37
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interrogations in the war on terror would, in the future, abide by the US Army Field
Manual on Interrogation, 41 which, in its 2006 revision, clearly prohibits cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment and classifies waterboarding as torture. 42
In 2010, however, Congress drew a clear line between the rules applicable for
interrogations conducted by DOJ personnel (such as the FBI) for purposes of
normal criminal investigations, and military or CIA interrogators, by explicitly
prohibiting the latter from advising suspects of their right to counsel and to silence
as required by Miranda. 43

3.2.3 Rules If Conducted by Foreign Officials
Although courts have not enforced the strict requirements of due process and
Miranda on foreign interrogators when not acting in a "joint venture" with US
authorities, and would accept evidence gathered in violation of those tests, the line
has been drawn at conduct which "shocks the conscience of the court," and torture
would certainly constitute such conduct.

3.3 Conducting Searches Abroad
3.3.1

Rules If Conducted by Foreign Officials

The USSC has elaborated comprehensive case-law governing searches conducted
by US law enforcement officials in the US. In general, a search warrant based on
probable cause is required for the search of homes and other private spaces, unless
the police act under exigent circumstances. 44 However, these rules are not applied
when foreign officials independently conduct searches which yield evidence that is
subsequently offered in a US court. As with interrogations, the only limitation
would be if the way in which the search was conducted "shocked the conscience" of
the US Court. If US law enforcement officials "substantially participate" in the
investigation leading up to the search, then US Fourth Amendment law will be
applied. Mere presence of US law enforcement officials during the search and their
having requested foreign police to conduct the search does not, however, constitute
"substantial participation. " 45
41

Shane et al. (2009), Al6.
§§ 5-74, 5-75 Army Field Manual on Interrogation, FM2-22.3 (FM 34-52), Abrams (2008), 474.
43
10 USC§ 1040(a)(l)(2010).
44
For the exigent circumstances exception related to "hot pursuit" of a criminal, see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,310-311 (1967). For exceptions to protect life or property, see Brigham
City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-404 (2006).
45
United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1230-1231 (lith Cir. 1986).
42
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Rules If Conducted by US Law Enforcement Officials
(or with Their Cooperation)

If US officials conduct a search overseas, the target of which is a US-Citizen, then
the Fourth Amendment protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
applies. US courts have, however, determined that it is would not be practicable to
necessarily require judicial authorization, due to the lack of US magistrates overseas who have authority to issue such search warrants.
If a search is conducted overseas, however, and the target of the search is not a
US-citizen and has no ties to the US, then the USSC has held that the Fourth
Amendment only protects "the People" and that a foreigner would not be included
among the "People" as envisioned by the authors of the US Bill of Rights. 46 The
Fourth Amendment also does not apply when US officials search a foreigner on
board a ship in international waters. 47

3.4 Interception of Confidential Communications Abroad
3.4.1

Rules If Conducted by Foreign Officials

As with searches, a wiretap conducted by foreign officials will be governed by US
law and the Fourth Amendment if it is characterized as a "joint venture." For
instance, in one case wiretaps by Danish authorities were considered to be "joint
ventures" because US officials requested the wiretaps, were involved in daily
decoding and translation of the intercepted messages, and all information gathered
was turned over to US officials. 48 Once a "joint venture" has been found, then US
courts do not apply the US wiretap law, but determine, rather, whether the procedure used by the foreign country was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 49

3.4.2

Rules If Conducted by US Law Enforcement Officials

Where US officials engage in wiretapping overseas in normal criminal cases, then
courts will apply the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" analysis, and not insist
on judicial authorization, because there is usually no ability for US courts to issue
warrants in such situations. 5° Thus the federal wiretapping statute, known as "Title
III", which requires probable cause and judicial authorization, 51 will not be applied.
46

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-275 (1990).
United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d I, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007).
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United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
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In 1978 Congress enacted the FISA, which allowed the President, through the
AG, to order wiretapping of foreign agents or foreigners engaged in international
terrorism and conduct searches without judicial authorization. 52 The only exception
was if the execution of the measure might affect a US citizen or permanent resident,
in which case an order was required from a secret court, the FISA Court, based on
probable cause that the persons whose conversations were to be intercepted were
"foreign agents" or "involved in international terrorism." However this law was
mainly conceived for wiretapping and bugging within the US.
Following amendments to FISA in 2008, the President, through the AG, may
now authorize wiretaps of foreigners abroad for up to l year to collect foreign
intelligence information or if there is probable cause that they are involved in
international terrorism. Although no judicial authorization is required, the AG
must submit a certification to the court indicating the necessity of the wiretaps,
the fact that precautions have been made to minimize interception of conversations
of US citizens, etc. 5 3
If, however, the government wants to intercept conversations of US citizens
when they are abroad, but by using telecommunications facilities located in the US,
they must get authorization from the FISA court, which authorization is valid for 90
days. 54 If there are emergency circumstances, however, the government may
intercept private conversations of a US-citizen for 7 days before getting retroactive
authorization from the FISA court. 55 If US officials wish to target a US-citizen
abroad under any other circumstances (i.e. when the law enforcement officials are
conducting the interceptions abroad) in order to obtain foreign intelligence information, then they only may do so if the person would not have a reasonable
expectation of privacl6 had the interception been conducted in the US. 57

3.5

Depositions of Witnesses Abroad

The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right [... ] to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The
Confrontation Clause is meant "to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding." This is accomplished generally by giving a criminal defendant "the

52
53

54
55
56
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§ 1802.
50 USC § 1881 a( a,g).
50USC§ 188lb(a,b).
50 USC § 1881 b( d)(l )(B).

0nly investigative actions which violate a citizen's "reasonable expectation of privacy" are
regulated by the Fourth Amendment. USSC, Katz v. United States, 394 U.S. 347, 360-361 (1967)
(Harlan, concurring).
57
50 USC§ 188lc(a)(2).
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right to confront appearing witnesses face to face and the right to conduct rigorous
cross-examination of those witnesses."58 Out-of-court statements introduced to
prove the truth of the matter stated, which are the results of police investigative
measures, such as questioning, or depositions, are barred by the Sixth Amendment
unless it is shown that the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant
had prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 5 9
Depositions to preserve testimony in criminal cases, are, pursuant to FRCrimP
15, to be used only in "exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice" and
are generally disfavored in criminal cases. 60 When the government conducts a Rule
15 deposition in a foreign land with a view toward introducing it in a US criminal
trial, the Sixth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that the government undertake
diligent efforts to facilitate the defendant's presence at the deposition and the
witness's presence at trial. 61
A court was held to have "diligently" undertaken to secure the defendant's
appearance at a deposition in the United Kingdom, where it directed the US
government to transport the defendant's attorney to the deposition and install two
telephone lines--one to allow the defendant to monitor the deposition from prison
and another to allow him to consult privately with counsel.62
In a case involving an alleged Al-Qaeda affiliate charged with a number of
terrorist acts in the US, including conspiracy to assassinate President George W.
Bush, the validity of a handwritten confession given by the defendant in Saudi
Arabian custody was at issue. Because it was impossible to bring two Saudi
officials, whom the defendant accused of torturing him, to the US, the trial court
ordered two defense attorneys to attend their depositions in Saudi Arabia. A live,
two-way video link was used to transmit the proceedings to a courtroom in Virginia,
where the defendant and his lawyer could see and hear the testimony contemporaneously and the witnesses could see and hear the defendant as they testified. 63 The
USSC has allowed the taking of testimony in the physical absence of the defendant
so long as the denial of face-to-face confrontation is "necessary to further an
important public policy" and "the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured."64 In Abu Ali, the court found that national security against terrorist acts
was a sufficiently compelling public policy."65 In contrast, in a prosecution for

~ 8 United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997).
~ 9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
60

United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1993).
United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1997).
62
/bid., 9.
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USSC, United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 238-243 (4th Cir. 2008).
64
USSC, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-852 (1990)(case involving testimony of a child
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fraud and conspiracy, it was reversible error to allow two Australian witnesses to
testify via two-way video, when there was no important public policy other than the
convenience of not paying for their trip to the US. 66

4 Admissibility of Evidence Gathered Abroad in US Courts
4.1
4.1.1

Effect of Unlawful Detentions on Admissibility of Evidence
In the Civilian Criminal Courts

An unlawful arrest constitutes an unlawful "seizure" in terms of the Fourth Amendment, but will never constitute a hindrance to a prosecution of the person arrested.
On the other hand, a person unlawfully arrested may move to suppress evidence
which was gathered pursuant to a search incident to the arrest as long as it is deemed
to have been a "fruit of the poisonous tree". 67 Similarly, a confession taken after an
unlawful arrest has also been deemed to be "fruit of the poisonous tree" even when
the police have advised the unlawfully arrested person of the right to silence and aid
of a lawyer as required by the Miranda decision. 68
Although a person arrested by police without an arrest warrant must be brought
to court within 48 hours to enable him to challenge the validity of his arrest, 69 the
fact that this time limit was violated will not automatically lead to suppression of a
statement taken after the 48 hours had elapsed. 70 In the federal courts, however,
there is a presumption that a confession will be suppressed if it was taken more than
6 hours after arrest and the defendant was not brought to court in a speedy
manner. 71 When someone has been held as an enemy combatant for years at
Guantanamo Bay, for instance, and is then charged in the criminal courts, the US
courts do not treat the time spent in the camps for enemy combatants as time which
counts in the analysis of whether the right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the US, has been violated. 72 At any rate, the remedy for a violation
of the right to a speedy trial in the US civilian courts is normally dismissal, and not
suppression of evidence. 73
66

USSC, United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1316 (II th Cir. 2006). But for a case allowing two
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In Military Commissions

The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not applicable in a trial by military
commission. 74

4.2

4.2.1

Admissibility of Evidence Resulting from Illegal
Interrogations
In the Civilian Criminal Courts

The USSC has consistently held that "involuntary" confessions which were the
products of coercion, deception, threats or promises, most of which do not amount
to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment", much less torture, could not be used in
US criminal trials. The prevailing view has been that evidence derived from involuntary statements is inadmissible in a criminal trial, even ifthe "fruit" ofthe involuntary
statement is a subsequent voluntary statement.75 The prohibition extends to all "fruits
of the poisonous tree", including physical evidence?6 For example, Rwandan
nationals were arrested in Uganda for the murder of two US tourists. They were
first subject to coerced interrogation by Ugandan officials and then turned over to US
officials, who interviewed them in a non-coercive manner. The US federal district
court, however, refused to use the statements taken by US officials, for it ruled they
were the "fruit" of the earlier coercive interrogations by Ugandan officials?7
Where US law enforcement officials are involved in conducting interrogations
overseas and are thus required to give modified Miranda warnings to those under
interrogation, a failure to give the modified warnings would also lead to exclusion
of the statements.

4.2.2

In Military Commissions

The secret use of the "enhanced interrogation techniques," described above, in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo, and other unnamed "black sites" by military and
CIA interrogators, would, of course, result in the inadmissibility of any declaration,
or its "fruits" in a subsequent criminal prosecution in the civilian courts. However,
the USSC recently ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is not violated unless the statement gathered as a result of the use
illegal interrogation methods is actually used in a criminal proceeding. 78 Thus, the
74
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government could conceivably continue to use torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment for the purpose of gathering intelligence information, as long
as they do not present it at trial. For example, Jose Padilla, an American citizen who
alleged he was tortured after being arrested for having allegedly planned an attack
on American soil with a "dirty bomb," was denied the right to sue one ofthe author
of the torture memos, John Yoo, because no incriminating statements were
introduced in criminal proceedings against him. 79
It has been surmised, that the evidence linking Padilla to the "dirty bomb" plot
resulted from the "waterboarding" of KSM and that the government thus eventually
dropped those charges when Padilla's case was set for trial in the civilian courts. 80
Many believe that the government established military commissions, however, for
the express purpose of prosecuting alleged terrorists using such tainted evidence.
10 USC§ 948r(a) of the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which amended the
2006 act after Obama took office, explicitly outlaws use of any statements induced by
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in trials by military commission. 10
USC§ 948r(c) also provides that only "voluntary" statements are admissible before
military commissions, unless "the statement was made incident to lawful conduct
during military operations at the point of capture or during closely related active
combat engagement, and the interests of justice would best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence." This allowance of more intensive methods of
interrogation would thus only apply where the capture of the interrogated person
was effected under battlefield-like conditions.

4.3
4.3.1

Admissibility of Evidence Resulting from Illegal Searches
In the Civilian Criminal Courts

In a certain sense, evidence gathered by foreign officials, even if done in violation
of their own laws, is admissible on a "silver platter" in the US courts, which will not
inquire into whether the foreign officials followed their own laws properly. 81 The
underlying reason for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in the US is to deter
willful police violations of the constitutional rights of US citizens, 82 and exclusion
of evidence in the US courts would not have such an effect on foreign law
enforcement officials. 83 Evidence from a foreign search of a US-citizen will,
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however, be inadmissible, if the manner in which the foreign officials conducted the
search "shocks the conscience'' or if the search is part of a "joint venture" with US
officials and it violates the Fourth Amendment. 84

4.3.2

In Military Tribunals

10 USC§ 949a(b)(2)(B) of the Military Commissions Act of 2009, provides that
"evidence shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on the grounds
that the evidence was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or other authorization.
This essentially means, that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule articulated in
Mapp v. Ohio does not apply to such trials.

4.4 Admissibility of Evidence Resulting from Illegal Wiretaps
4.4.1

In the Civilian Criminal Courts

When core provisions of the US wiretap statute have been violated, 18 USC§ 2515
provides that "no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence
derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof." This is likely the broadest explicit statutory
exclusionary rule in US law and clearly extends to "fruits of the poisonous tree." It
also does not allow a "good faith" exception. 85 A similar strong exclusionary rule
applies if the provisions for FISA are violated, either during a wiretap or search for
foreign intelligence information conducted in the US or in relation to a US-citizen
abroad. 86

4.4.2

In Military Tribunals

It is unclear whether the provision in the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which
allows evidence to be used even if it was gathered without judicial authorization,
would trump the seeming ironclad exclusionary rules in the domestic wiretap act
and FISA.
84
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4.5 Admissibility of Evidence Gathered in Violation of the Right
to Confrontation
4.5.1

In the Civilian Criminal Courts

In a normal criminal trial, due process requires that exculpatory evidence or
evidence which might mitigate punishment must be turned over to the defense. If
that evidence is not turned over, and would have resulted in an acquittal or
mitigation in charge or judgment, reversal of the judgment is required. 87 If the
potentially exculpatory evidence is protected by a privilege, then, once the defendant has made a plausible offer of proof that the evidence could be relevant and
helpful to defense, the judge usually must review the requested material in an in
camera hearing to determine whether the evidence should be disclosed. 88 If it
should, then the prosecutor has a choice of revealing the evidence, or dismissing
the case to protect the privileged information. 89
Since 9-11, the federal government has maintained that nearly all evidence
gathered during terrorist investigations, especially that gathered overseas by intelligence agents, is subject to the "official secrets" privilege and that its revelation
would prejudice national security and impede the war against terrorism. 90
In 1980 Congress passed the Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA), 91 to
deal with cases involving state secrets or "classified information." In CIPA, the
legislator attempted to balance the right of the defense to discover evidence in the
hands of the prosecution against the needs of the state to protect information which
was crucial to national security. CIPA attempted to minimize the defense threat to
reveal secret evidence during the trial, a practice called "graymail." According to
CIPA, "classified information" consists in any infonnation or material determined
by the government of the US to "require protection against unauthorized revelation
for reasons of national security.'.n A typical "graymail" case is where a former
employee of the CIA, charged with criminal wrongdoing, threatens to reveal, or to
use in his defense, evidence the government considers to be classified.
If the defendant seeks discovery of information which is "classified" or contains
state secrets, which may be in the form of statements given by a witness to US
officials, the judge may authorize the prosecutor to "eliminate classified information in the documents which are turned over to the defense" or to substitute it with a
summary of the information in lieu of the secret documents themselves, or to offer a
declaration, admitting the relevant facts which the classified information would
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have a tendency to prove.'m The prosecutor can request that the hearing be held in
camera to prevent divulgation of the information to the public. 94 If a summary or
substitute finding of fact is deemed by the trial judge to not satisfactorily protect the
rights of the defendant to present a defense, the court may order full disclosure.
CIPA played a role in the case against Zacharias Moussaoui, an admitted
member of AI Qaeda, who the Department of Justice originally thought was the
20th hijacker in the 9-11 attacks. Moussaoui' s defense counsel wanted to interview
two AI Qaeda members, Ramzi bin ai-Shibh and KSM, when they were being held
by the CIA in "black sites" at an unknown location. Moussaoui maintained, that the
prisoners could have testified at trial that he did not participate in the conspiracy
which resulted in the 9-11 attacks. Despite this claim, the appellate courts ruled that
the trial should continue despite the fact that the defendant did not have the
possibility to examine the witnesses. The court of appeal relied on CIPA in holding
that the prosecutor could utilize a summary of the declarations of the prisoners in
lieu of the declarations. 95 The use of "summaries," or stipulations in lieu of actual
witnesses clearly undermines the right to confront witnesses, the right to discovery
of useful evidence, and the ability of the triers of fact, whether jury or military
panel, to assess the credibility of evidence in terrorist cases.

4.5.2 In Military Commissions
Provisions very similar to those of CIPA are also included in the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, and allow the use of stipulations, summaries, and
other substitutes for directly cross-examining a witness. 96 More importantly, however, while the defendant has a right to cross-examine the witnesses who testify
against him,97 the rule of Crawford v. Washington, which prevents the introduction
of testimonial evidence in the form of witness declarations made outside of trial (for
instance to a police officer), does not apply, for hearsay evidence is clearly
admissible. Thus, 10 USC§ 949a(b)(2)(A) allows the judge to accept any evidence
which would have "probative value to a reasonable person" and 10 USC§ 949a(b)
(2)(E) provides:
hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by
general courts-martial may be admitted in a trial by military commission if the proponent of
the evidence makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, the intention of the proponent to
offer the evidence, and the particulars of the evidence (including information on the general
circumstances under which the evidence was obtained).
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Cooperation with International Tribunals
and Human Rights
The Ad Hoc Tribunals

American judicial assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the Rwanda Tribunal (hereafter the ad hoc tribunals) is given
through two surrender agreements, 98 corresponding implementing legislation,99
and use of the normal judicial assistance framework including the use of letters
rogatory discussed above. These provide American cooperation with ad hoc
tribunals in conformity with Article 29 of the ICTY Statute, and Article 28 of the
ICTR Statute governing judicial assistance.

5.2

The International Criminal Court

It is well-known that President George W. Bush withdrew former President Bill
Clinton's signature of the Rome Treaty which set up the ICC, and withdrew all
cooperation with the new court. The US has signed bilateral agreements with at
least one hundred countries preventing those countries from extraditing US citizens
to the ICC without prior US approval. 100 The goal of these agreements is to protect
US citizens, and especially US military personnel, from ICC prosecution. Critics
have accused the US of blackmailing third countries into signing Article 98
agreements with the specter of withdrawal of US aid. 101 In 2002, Congress passed
the ASPA 102 which prohibits military assistance to countries (other than NATO
countries or major non-NATO allies) that are party to the ICC but do not have
Article 98 agreements with the US.
Apart from withholding military aid from countries not signing Article 98
agreements, the ASPA also puts a long list of restrictions on US involvement
with the ICC, as well as with countries who are parties to the ICC. These include:
(1) a prohibition on funding extradition to a foreign country that is under an
obligation to surrender persons to the ICC 103 ; (2) a prohibition on judicial cooperation with the ICC, including responding to requests for assistance, transmitting
letters rogatory sent by the ICC to their intended recipient, providing financial
98

Both agreements are identical. Godinho (2003), 502-516. The ICTY agreement is UNTS, vol.
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assistance to the ICC, extraditing to the ICC, or allowing ICC agents to perform
investigations within the US 104; (3) a prohibition on sending classified information
to the ICC 105 ; (4) express authorization for the president to use "all means necessary and appropriate" (apart from bribes) to release US citizens or allies detained or
imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the ICC. 106
The Obama administration, however, has increased its cooperation with the ICC.
State Department legal advisor Harold Koh said after the 2010 Kampala conference, at which the crime of aggression was defined, that "we have reset the default
on the US relationship with the court from hostility to positive engagement." The
US was the only country not a State Party to make a pledge at the Kampala
conference. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2009 regarding US relations
with the ICC: "Whether we work toward joining or not, we will end hostility toward
the ICC and look for opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that
promote US interests by bringing war criminals to justice." 107 The US became an
observer nation to the ICC in 2009, and is continuing to look for ways to assist the
ICC in spite of US laws restricting cooperation. 108
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